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LENGTH-BASED ATTACKS IN POLYCYCLIC GROUPS
DAVID GARBER, DELARAM KAHROBAEI, HA T. LAM
Abstract. The Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld (AAG) key-exchange protocol was
implemented and studied with the braid groups as its underlying platform. The
length-based attack, introduced by Hughes and Tannenbaum, has been used
to cryptanalyze the AAG protocol in this setting. Eick and Kahrobaei suggest
to use the polycyclic groups as a possible platform for the AAG protocol.
In this paper, we apply several known variants of the length-based attack
against the AAG protocol with the polycyclic group as the underlying plat-
form. The experimental results show that, in these groups, the implemented
variants of the length-based attack are unsuccessful in the case of polycyclic
groups having high Hirsch length. This suggests that the length-based at-
tack is insufficient to cryptanalyze the AAG Protocol, when implemented over
this type of polycyclic groups. This implies that polycyclic groups could be
a potential platform for some cryptosystems based on conjugacy search prob-
lem, such as non-commutative Diffie-Hellman, El Gamal and Cramer-Shoup
key-exchange protocols.
Moreover, we compare for the first time between the success rate of the
different variants of the length-based attack. These experiments show that, in
these groups, the memory length-based attack introduced by Garber, Kaplan,
Teicher, Tsaban and Vishne does better than the other variants proposed thus
far in this context.
1. Introduction
The Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld (AAG) key-exchange protocol was introduced in
1999 [1]. Following its introduction, the AAG protocol was extensively studied
using different groups as its underlying platform. Ko et al. [15] used braid groups.
Moreover, Myasnikov and Ushakov [18] studied the security of the AAG protocol
with respect to several attacks on any platform groups satisfying some theoretic
properties (exponentially generic free basis property).
Hughes and Tannenbaum [11] introduced the length-based attack (LBA) on the
AAG protocol with its implementation in braid groups. They emphasized the im-
portance of choosing the correct length function. Later, Garber et al. [6] gave several
realizations of this approach, particularly a length function for the braid group and
experimental results suggesting that the attack fails for the parameters suggested
in existing protocols. However, Garber et al. [5] also suggested an extension of
the length-based attack which uses memory which succeeded in cryptanalyzing the
AAG protocol. Similar attack was implemented against a system based on the
Thompson group [19]. Most recently, Myasnikov and Ushakov [17] analyzed the
reasons behind the failure of the previous implementations of the LBA, such as the
occurrence of commutator-type peaks, and gave an experimental evidence that the
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LBA can be modified to cryptanalyze the AAG protocol with high success rate.
However, this work is again done the braid groups as the underlying platform.
Eick and Kahrobaei [3] have suggested a different platform for the AAG protocol -
the polycyclic group. In polycyclic groups, the word problem can be solved efficiently
[7], but known solutions to the conjugacy problem are much less efficient. Using
experimental results, Eick and Kahrobaei showed that while the conjugacy problem
can be solved within seconds using polycyclic groups with small Hirsch length, the
conjugacy problem in polycyclic groups with high Hirsch length requires a much
longer time for its solution.
Taking inspiration from this result, we investigate the success rate of the length-
based attack on the AAG protocol, where the underlying platform is the polycyclic
groups, especially those with high Hirsch length. Toward this end, we first construct
polycyclic groups of high Hirsch length using a method introduced by Holt et al. [10].
Then, we implement the different variants of the LBA presented in [5, 6, 17]. The
experimental results that we collect suggest that the LBA is insufficient to crypt-
analyze the AAG protocol, when we use the polycyclic groups with high enough
Hirsch length as the underlying platform. Consequently, the polycyclic group is
the first underlying platform which the LBA is insufficient for cryptanalyzing the
AAG protocol on this platform, whereas the solution for the word problem is quite
efficient. A suggestion for concrete parameters appears in the last section.
Moreover, we compare for the first time on any platform between the success
rate of the different variants of the LBA.
As a wider application, we note that the conjugacy search problem is the basis for
various cryptographic protocols besides AAG, such as the non-commutative Diffie-
Hellman key-exchange [15], the non-commutative El-Gamal key-exchange [12], the
non-abelian Cramer-Shoup key-exchange [2] and the non-commutative digital sig-
natures [13]. The LBA can be applied to all these protocols; therefore, a platform
group which experimental results show that the LBA is insufficient for cryptana-
lyzing the AAG protocol over this platform, such as polycyclic groups, can help
instantiate them.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the Anshel-Anshel-
Goldfeld key-exchange protocol. In Section 3, we give a short review of polycyclic
groups and the construction that we have used. In Section 4, we review the length-
based attack, and in Section 5, we present the experiments, their results and cor-
responding conclusions.
2. The Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld key-exchange protocol
Following [17], we present here the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld key-exchange proto-
col (for more details, see [1]). As usual, we use two entities, called Alice and Bob,
for presenting the two parties which plan to communicate over an insecure channel.
Let G be a group with generators g1, . . . , gn. First, Alice chooses her public set
a = (a1, . . . , aN1), where ai ∈ G, and Bob chooses his public set b = (b1, . . . , bN2),
where bi ∈ G. They both publish their sets. Alice then chooses her private key
A = aε1s1 · · · a
εL
sL
, where asi ∈ a and εi ∈ {±1}. Bob also chooses his private key
B = bδ1t1 · · · b
δL
tL
, where bti ∈ b and δi ∈ {±1}. Alice computes b
′
i = A
−1biA for all
bi ∈ b and sends it to Bob. Bob also computes a′i = B
−1aiB for all ai ∈ a and sends
it to Alice. Now, the shared secret key is K = A−1B−1AB. Alice can computes
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this key by:
KA = A
−1(a′ε1s1 · · · a
′εL
sL
) = A−1(B−1as1B)
ε1 · · · (B−1asLB)
εL =
= A−1B−1(aε1s1 · · ·a
εL
sL
)B = A−1B−1AB = K.
Similarly, Bob can compute KB = B
−1(b′δ1t1 · · · b
′δL
tL
) = B−1A−1BA, and then he
knows the shared secret key by K = K−1B .
In order to findK, it is enough for the eavesdropper either to find A′ ∈ 〈a1, . . . , aN1〉
such that b′ = A′−1bA′ or to find B′ ∈ 〈b1, . . . , bN2〉 such that a
′ = B′−1aB′ (an
incompatible sufficient condition can be found in [14]). Thus, the security of the
AAG protocol is based on the assumption that the subgroup-restricted simultane-
ous conjugacy search problem is hard.
3. Polycyclic groups
In this section, we give a short review for polycyclic groups and describe the
construction of polycyclic groups of high Hirsch length. For more details, see [10].
3.1. The polycyclic presentation. Recall that G is a polycyclic group if it has
a polycyclic series, i.e., a subnormal series
G = G1 ⊲G2 ⊲ · · ·⊲Gn+1 = {1},
with non-trivial cyclic factors. The polycyclic generating sequence of G is the n-
tuple (g1, . . . , gn), such that Gi = 〈gi, Gi+1〉 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Any polycyclic group has a finite presentation of the form:
〈g1, . . . , gn | g
gi
j = wij , g
g
−1
i
j = vij , g
rk
k = ukk for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n and k ∈ I〉
where wij , vij , ukk are words in the generators gi+1, . . . , gn and I is the set of indices
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that ri = [Gi : Gi+1] is finite. Here ab stands for b−1ab.
It is known by induction that each element of G defined by this presentation can
be uniquely written as g = ge11 · · · g
en
n where ei ∈ Z for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and 0 ≤ ei < ri for
i ∈ I. We call g = ge11 · · · g
en
n the normal form of an element in G. If every element
in the group can be uniquely presented in the normal form, then the polycyclic
presentation is called consistent. Note that every polycyclic group has a consistent
polycyclic presentation [10].
The Hirsch length of a polycyclic group is the number of indices i such that
ri = [Gi : Gi+1] is infinite. This number is invariant of the chosen polycyclic
sequence.
3.2. Constructing polycyclic groups using number fields. There are several
ways for constructing polycyclic groups. For the purpose of this paper, we construct
polycyclic groups by semidirect products of the maximal order and the unit group
of a number field. This construction follows [10].
Let f(x) ∈ Z[x] be an irreducible polynomial. The polynomial f defines a field
extension F over Q. The maximal order or the ring of integers OF of the number
field F is the set of algebraic integers in F :
OF = {a ∈ F | there exists a monic polynomial fa(x) ∈ Z[x] such that fa(a) = 0}.
The unit group of F is:
UF = {a ∈ OF | a 6= 0 and a
−1 ∈ OF }.
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For constructing the polycyclic group by the maximal order and the unit group
of a number field F where [F : Q] = n, we recall two results. First, the maximal
order OF forms a ring whose additive group is isomorphic to Z
n [20]. Second,
Dirichlet’s unit theorem states that given n = s + 2t, where s and 2t are the
numbers of real field monomorphisms F → R and complex field monomorphisms
F → C respectively, then the unit group UF is a finitely-generated abelian group of
the form UF ∼= Zs+t−1 × Zm for some even m [20]. Here, we use the fact that the
unit group is a finitely-generated abelian group and hence UF is also polycyclic.
Let G be a group and N E G, it is easy to see that if N and G/N are both
polycyclic, then the group G is also polycyclic by putting together the polycyclic
series of N and the series induced by the polycyclic series of G/N . Since the
above results guaranteed that the maximal order is a polycyclic group and the unit
group, which is isomorphic to G/OF , is also polycyclic, the group G = OF ⋊ UF
is polycyclic. The action which defines the semidirect product is a multiplication
from the right of UF on OF .
If N E G ,the Hirsch length of a polycyclic group G is h(G) = h(N) + h(G/N);
in our case, h(G) = h(OF ) + h(UF ), where h(OF ) is n, which is the degree of
the generating polynomial f . Hence, for constructing a polycyclic group of high
Hirsch length, we have to find an irreducible polynomial of high enough degree, and
then the polycyclic group constructed by the above method will have Hirsch length
larger than the degree of the polynomial.
3.3. Polycyclic groups as platform groups for the AAG protocol. Poly-
cyclic groups are suitable as platform groups for the AAG protocol for several
reasons. First, the word problem can be solved efficiently using the collection algo-
rithm [7], see also [3]. Second, the conjugacy search problem has no efficient solution
in general polycyclic groups. This assessment is due to Eick and Kahrobaei [3], us-
ing the following experiment: let K = Q[x]/(fw) be an algebraic number field
for a cyclotomic polynomial fw, where w is a primitive r-th root of unity. Let
G(w) = O ⋊ U , where O is the maximal order and U the unit group of K, r the
order of w and h(G(w)) the Hirsch length. The average time used for 100 appli-
cations of the collection algorithm on random words and the average time used for
100 applications of the conjugacy algorithm on random conjugates are:
r h(G(w)) Collection Conjugation
3 2 0.00 seconds 9.96 seconds
4 2 0.00 seconds 9.37 seconds
7 6 0.01 seconds 10.16 seconds
11 14 0.05 seconds > 100 hours
We can see that the collection algorithm works very fast even for polycyclic
groups of high Hirsch length, and therefore the word problem has an efficient solu-
tion. On the other hand, the solution to the conjugacy problem is not efficient for
polycyclic groups having high Hirsch length.
4. The length-based attack
The length-based attack (LBA) is a probabilistic attack against the conjugacy
search problem in general, and against the AAG protocol in particular, with the
goal of finding Alice’s (or Bob’s) private key. It is based on the idea that a conju-
gation of the correct element should decrease the length of the captured package.
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Using the notations of Section 2, the captured package is b′ = (b′1, . . . , b
′
N2
), where
b′i = A
−1biA. If we conjugate b′ with elements from the group 〈a1, . . . , aN1〉 and
the length of the resulting tuple has been decreased, then we have found a can-
didate for the conjugating factor. The process of conjugation is then repeated
with the decreased-length tuple until a longer candidate for the conjugating factor
is found. The process ends when the conjugated captured package is the same
as b = (b1, . . . , bN2), which is known. Then, the conjugate can be recovered
by reversing the sequence of conjugating factors. For more details on the LBA,
see [5, 6, 9, 16, 17].
4.1. Variants of the LBA. In [5, 6, 17, 19], several variants of the LBA are pre-
sented. Here, we give four variants of the LBA that we implemented against the
AAG protocol having the polycyclic group as its underlying platform. In all these
variants, the following input and output are expected:
• Input: a = (a1, . . . , aN1), b = (b1, . . . , bN2) and b
′ = (b′1, . . . , b
′
N2
), such
that b′i = b
A
i for i = 1, . . . , N2.
• Output: An element A′ ∈ 〈a1, . . . , aN1〉 such that b
′
i = b
A′
i for i =
1, . . . , N2, or FAIL if the algorithm cannot find such A
′.
We will use the following notation: if c = (c1, . . . , ck), then its total length |c| is∑k
i=1 |ci| (the length of ci, |ci|, will be discussed in Section 4.2).
4.1.1. LBA with backtracking. The most straight-forward variant of LBA (Algo-
rithm 1) conjugates b′ directly with a±1i ∈ {a1, . . . , aN1}. This is termed “LBA
with backtracking” by Myasnikov and Ushakov [17].
Algorithm 1 LBA with backtracking
1: Initialize S = {(b′, idG)}.
2: while S 6= ∅ do
3: Choose (c, x) ∈ S such that |c| is minimal. Remove (c, x).
4: for i = 1, . . . , N1 and ε = ±1 do
5: Compute δi,ε = |c| −
∣
∣ca
ε
i
∣
∣.
6: if ca
ε
i = b then output inverse of xaεi and stop.
7: if δi,ε > 0 then ⊲ length has been decreased
8: Add
(
ca
ε
i , xaεi
)
to S.
9: end if
10: end for
11: end while
12: Otherwise, output FAIL. ⊲ no more elements to conjugate
4.1.2. LBA with a dynamic set. Through analysis, Myasnikov and Ushakov [17]
concluded that different types of peaks make LBA unsuccessful. To overcome this,
they suggested a new version of the algorithm, which they termed “LBA with a
dynamic set”. Here, if a generator ai causes a length reduction, only the conjugates
and products involving ai are added to the dynamic set. On the other hand, if no
generator causes a length reduction, all conjugates and two generators products are
added. Their experimental results suggest that this algorithm works especially well
in the case of keys composed from long generators, but it is not worse than the naive
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algorithm in the other cases. The algorithm presented here is a modified version
of their algorithm, which we implemented to attack the AAG protocol having the
polycyclic group as its underlying platform.
Algorithm 2 LBA with a dynamic set
1: Initialize S = {(b′, idG)}.
2: while S 6= ∅ do
3: Choose (c, x) ∈ S such that |c| is minimal. Remove (c, x).
4: for i = 1, . . . , N1 and ε = ±1 do
5: Compute δi,ε = |c| −
∣
∣ca
ε
i
∣
∣
6: end for
7: if δi,ε ≤ 0 for all i then
8: Define aext = a ∪ {xixjx
−1
i , xixj , x
2
i | xi, xj ∈ a
±1, i 6= j}.
9: else Define aext = a∪{xjxmx
−1
j , xmxj , xjxm, x
2
m | xj ∈ a
±1,m 6= j} where
xm such that δm = max{δi,ε | i = 1, . . . , N1}.
10: end if
11: for all w ∈ aext do
12: Compute δw = |c| − |c
w|.
13: end for
14: if cw = b then output inverse of xw and stop.
15: if δw > 0 then ⊲ length has been decreased
16: Add (cw, xw) to S.
17: end if
18: end while
19: Otherwise, output FAIL. ⊲ no more elements to conjugate
4.1.3. Memory-LBA. Another variant, presented in [5], is also considered. In this
variant, we allocate an array S of a fixed sizeM . The array S holdsM tuples every
round. In every round, all elements of S are conjugated, but only the M smallest
conjugated tuples (with respect to their length) are inserted back into S. For the
halting condition, we use a predefined time-out.
Algorithm 3 Memory-LBA
1: Initialize S = {(|b′|, b′, idG)}.
2: while not time-out do
3: for (|c|, c, x) ∈ S do
4: Remove (|c|, c, x) from S.
5: Compute ca
ε
i for all i ∈ {1 . . .N1} and ε ∈ {±1}.
6: if ca
ε
i = b then output inverse of xaεi and stop.
7: Save
(∣∣ca
ε
i
∣
∣ , ca
ε
i , xaεi
)
in S′.
8: end for
9: After finished all conjugations, sort S′ by the first element of every tuple
10: Copy the smallest M elements into S and delete the rest of S′
11: end while
12: Otherwise, output FAIL.
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4.1.4. LBA* (with memory). We present a different variant of memory-LBA which
is again based on a fixed-size array allocated for the algorithm. Here, S holds M
tuples every round and is sorted by the first element (with respect to the length of
conjugated element) of each tuple. In every round, only the smallest element of S
is removed and conjugated by all the generators and their inverses. The conjugated
tuples are inserted back into S depending on whether there is a free place in S. If
there is no more places in S, and the conjugated tuple is smaller than the largest
element in S, swap them and re-sort S. Since S is always kept sorted, any operation
to find the “smallest element” costs constant time. As in the previous variant, we
use a predefined time-out as the halting condition.
The name LBA* comes from the general idea of A* search algorithm [8], which
uses a best-first search (as we are doing here - taking the smallest element of S and
conjugated it). We should note that a very similar algorithm was independently
introduced by Tsaban [21], and the difference between the two variants is that our
variant starts the search from b′, while Tsaban’s variant starts the search from both
directions: b′ and b′ (using the idea of “meet in the middle”).
Algorithm 4 LBA* (with memory)
1: Initialize S = {(|b′|, b′, idG)}.
2: while not time-out do
3: Choose (|c|, c, x) ∈ S such that |c| is minimal. Remove (|c|, c, x).
4: for i = 1, . . . , N1 and ε = ±1 do
5: Compute ca
ε
i .
6: if ca
ε
i = b then output inverse of xaεi and stop.
7: if Size(S) < M then
8: Add
(∣∣ca
ε
i
∣∣ , ca
ε
i , xaεi
)
to S and sort S by first element of every tuple.
9: else ⊲ no more space in S
10: if
∣
∣ca
ε
i
∣
∣ is smaller than first element of all tuples in S then swap them
11: end if
12: end for
13: end while
14: Otherwise, output FAIL. ⊲ no more elements to conjugate
4.2. The length function. In the implementation of the LBA, the choice of the
length function is important (see [5,9]). In our case, the length of a word is chosen
to be the sum of the absolute values of the exponents in its normal form. We choose
this function because the experimental results presented below show that it satisfies
the requirement ℓ(a−1ba)≫ ℓ(b) (as needed for a length function used for LBA).
The first step of the experiments is the construction of a polycyclic group G of a
given Hirsch length h(G), following the construction in Sections 3.2 and 5.1. Then,
an element b of length between 10 and 13 is randomly chosen; we choose elements
of this length for consistency with the LBA parameters. Another random element
a satisfying the same length interval is chosen and ba is computed, and finally, we
compute |ba|−|b|. We performed 100 tests for each group and the average difference
is recorded.
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Polynomial h(G) Average difference
x2 − x− 1 3 79.92
x5 − x3 − 1 7 80.17
x11 − x3 − 1 16 44.93
As we can see, the average difference is large; specifically |ba|− |b| is significantly
larger than |a|, indicating that the condition ℓ(a−1ba)≫ ℓ(b) is indeed satisfied.
5. Experimental results
Our goal is to apply the LBA on the AAG protocol having the polycyclic group
as its underlying platform. To that end, we implemented the four variants of the
LBA presented in Section 4 and performed experiments on several polycyclic groups
having different Hirsch lengths.
5.1. Implementation details. Each polycyclic group is constructed by choosing
an irreducible polynomial f over Z, thus f defines an algebraic field F over Q. Let
OF be its maximal order and UF be its unit group, thus OF ⋊ UF is the desired
polycyclic group. This construction follows [10] and is a part of the Polycyclic
package of GAP [4].
A random element ai, for Alice’s public set, or bi, for Bob’s public set, is gen-
erated by taking either some random generators of the group or their inverses and
multiplying them together, while maintaining that the length of the element is be-
tween a predefined minimum and maximum. By this method, we take control over
the length of the element.
Alice’s private key A is generated by taking a fixed number of random elements
in a = (a1, . . . , aN1) and multiplying them together. Here we forgo control over
length to preserve interesting cases of conjugations actually decreasing the length
of bi, such as a commutator-type peak. The way for choosing the keys is similar
to what has been used in [17]. This way also reflects the characterization of the
polycyclic group.
5.2. Results. We performed several sets of tests, all of which were run on an Intel
Core I7 quad-core 2.0GHz computer with 12GB of RAM, running Ubuntu Version
12.04 with GAP Version 4.5 and 10GB of memory allocation. In all these tests,
the polycyclic group G having Hirsch length h(G) is constructed by the above
method using polynomial f . The size of Alice’s and Bob’s public sets are both
N1 = N2 = 20.
5.2.1. The effect of the Hirsch length. In the first set of tests, the length of each
random element ai or bi is in the interval [L1, L2] = [10, 13] and Alice’s private
key is the product of L = 5 random elements in Alice’s public set. The time for
each batch of 100 tests are recorded together with its success rate. In each case, a
time-out of 60 minutes is enforced for each test. The following results are obtained
by LBA with a dynamic set:
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Polynomial h(G) Time Success rate of
LBA with a dynamic set
x2 − x− 1 3 0.20 hours 100%
x5 − x3 − 1 7 76.87 hours 35%
x7 − x3 − 1 10 94.43 hours 8%
x9 − 7x3 − 1 14 95.18 hours 5%
x11 − x3 − 1 16 95.05 hours 5%
From this table, we can see that with a small Hirsch length, the LBA crypt-
analyzes the AAG protocol easily with high success rate. However, as the Hirsch
length is increased to 7, the success rate decreases. In polycyclic groups with higher
Hirsch lengths, we can see the effect of the time-out more prominently as the total
time did not increase much more, but the success rate is dropped to 5%. Although
a success rate of 5% is not negligible, note that we use a very small value for L.
Based on the current experimental results, we expect that increasing the value of
L will reduce the success rate to 0%.
5.2.2. The effect of the key length. In the second set of tests, we vary the number of
elements L that compose Alice’s private key. Myasnikov and Ushakov [17] suggested
that the LBA with a dynamic set has a high success rate with long generators, i.e.
random elements have longer length [L1, L2]. Therefore, we also vary the length of
random elements according to the parameters in [17].
The following results are obtained by LBA with a dynamic set, with a time-out
of 30 minutes:
Polynomial h(G) [10,13] [20,23] [40,43]
L = 10 L = 10 L = 20 L = 50
x7 − x3 − 1 10 2% 0% 0% 0%
x9 − 7x3 − 1 14 0% 0% 0% 0%
x11 − 3x3 − 1 17 0% 0% 0% 0%
The results of this set of tests indicate that just by increasing the number of
generators of Alice’s private key from 5 (as in the previous set of tests) to 10, the
LBA already fails with polycyclic groups having Hirsch length as small as 10.
5.2.3. Comparing the four variants of the LBA. In this paper, we compare the
success rate of the four variants of the LBA for the first time on any platform. For
comparing the success rate of the four variants of the LBA, we purposely choose
the value of the test parameters to be very small in this set of tests. They are as
follows: N1 = N2 = 20, [L1, L2] = [5, 8], L = 5, there is a time-out of 30 minutes
and a memory of sizeM = 500. The polynomial used is f = x3−x−1, constructing
a polycyclic group of Hirsch length 4.
Algorithm Time Success rate
LBA with backtracking 0.57 hours 58%
LBA with a dynamic set 37.35 hours 95%
Memory-LBA (with memory M = 500) 4.01 hours 92%
LBA* (with memory M = 500) 32.00 hours 36%
Algorithm LBA with a dynamic set gives the best success rate but took much
longer than Algorithm Memory-LBA which gives a similar success rate in much
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shorter time. We conclude that with a sufficient size of memory, AlgorithmMemory-
LBA is the best variant of the LBA.
5.2.4. Using the four variants of the LBA on our test parameters. In the fourth
set of tests, we want to see the effect of the four different variants of the LBA
presented in Section 4.1 applied to our test parameters. Therefore, we keep the
following parameters for all the algorithms: the length of each random element is
in the interval [L1, L2] = [10, 13], Alice’s private key is the product of 10 elements
and the length of both public sets are N1 = N2 = 20. There is a time-out of 30
minutes per test and in the case of the two memory variants of the LBA, Algorithm
Memory-LBA and Algorithm LBA*, a memory of size M = 1000 is used. The
same polycyclic group G having Hirsch length 14 constructed by the polynomial
x9 − 7x3 − 1 is used for all the variants of the LBA.
Algorithm Time Success rate
LBA with backtracking 48.68 hours 0%
LBA with a dynamic set 50.04 hours 0%
Memory-LBA (with memory M = 1000) 49.35 hours 3%
LBA* (with memory M = 1000) 50.00 hours 0%
As we can see, Memory-LBA algorithm has the best performance in this set of
parameters, but even then, it has only 3% success rate. To further test Memory-
LBA algorithm, we ran another set of tests where we increase the length of random
elements to [L1, L2] = [20, 23] and increase the number of factors of the private key
to L = 20. To give it a chance of success, we increase the size of the memory M to
40,000. The result is 0% success rate.
5.2.5. The effect of increasing the time-out. Since it is possible that the time-out of
30 minutes for each test is too short, we ran another set of tests, where the time-out
is 4 hours for each test. Memory-LBA algorithm showed the most promise, so we
chose it with the following parameters: the length of random elements is in the
interval [L1, L2] = [20, 23], the number of factors of the private key is L = 20 and
the size of the memoryM is 1000. The polynomial used is x9−7x3−1 producing a
polycyclic group of Hirsch length 14. Due to the long time-out, we performed only
50 tests. We still get 0% success rate.
Based on the above experimental results, we conclude that the LBA is insufficient
for cryptanalyzing the polycyclic groups of high enough Hirsch lengths. One can
suggest the following parameters: h(G) = 16, L = 20 and [L1, L2] = [20, 23] for
achieving an AAG protocol based on the polycyclic group, which the known variants
of the LBA have 0% success rate for cryptanalyzing this protocol.
5.2.6. Additional experimental results concerning LBA with a dynamic set algo-
rithm. Here, we present some additional experimental results for LBA with a dy-
namic set. The time-out for each test is 1 hour. The polynomials used are f and
h(G) is the Hirsch length of the corresponding polycyclic group. The size of Alice’s
and Bob’s public sets are N1, N2 respectively. Each random element ai or bi has
length in [L1, L2] and Alice’s private key is the product of L = 5 random elements
in Alice’s public set. The success rate of a batch of 100 tests is recorded.
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Polynomial h(G) N1 = N2 = 5 N1 = N2 = 20
[5,8] [15,18] [10,13]
x− 1 1 98% 98%
x2 − x− 1 3 98% 96% 100%
x3 − x− 1 4 95% 100%
x5 − x3 − 1 7 35%
x7 − x3 − 1 10 8%
x9 − 7x3 − 1 14 5%
x11 − x3 − 1 16 59% 53% 5%
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